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1. INTRODUCTION
The significantly high growth rate in trade (especially in manufacturing goods) relative
to the production since the second World War has generated huge research interests among
international economists. Trade liberalization has certainly played an important role in
the growth of trade volume but many believe that the speed of trade liberalization sim-
ply cannot explain such a fast growth rate in trade. In their recent studies, Hummels, et
al. ( 2001) and Yi (2003) have provided both empirical evidence and theory that attribute
the high grow rate in trade to vertical specialization in production.1 On the other hand,
the increase in vertical specialization (including international outsourcing/fragmentation,
etc.) is also explained by trade liberalization and globalization (e.g., Jones, 2000; McLaren,
2001; Grossman and Helpman, 2002)2 By building a Smith-Ricardo model of interna-
tional trade, this paper suggests an alternative explanation for the increase in production
specialization and its impact on international trade, based on the recent revolution in com-
munication/information technology.
There is strong evidence that information technology has an impact on the industrial
structure of production and firms (Kabmil, 1991; Brynjolfsson et al. 1993). To my knowl-
edge, however, its potential impact on international trade (via changes in production struc-
ture) has not yet caught formal attention in the literature. Rather, the role of information
technology is only considered to be able to reduce trade costs and consequently increase the
trade volume.
The model is built on the classic thoughts by Adam Smith (1776) on division of labor
because I believe that in essence production specialization is division of labor. Smith’s idea
1Schmitt and Yu (2001, 2002) argue that trade liberalization can still explain a significant portion in
trade growth if we take into account the role of economies of scale in production and entry of new exporting
firms. There is, however, lots of empirical evidence on inreasing production specialization and trade (e.g.,
Campa and Goldberg, 1997; Hanson, Matoloni, and Slaughter, 2001).
2Also see Zhao (2001), and Chen, et al.(2003) for other explanations of international outsourcing. For an
overview on this topic, see Feenstra (2001), and the collections in Jones and Kierzkowski (2001) and Cheng
and Kierzkowski (2001).
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about the division of labor in a pin-factory is very simple: the specialization and concen-
tration of the workers on their single subtasks leads to greater skill and higher productivity
on their particular subtasks than would be achieved by the same number of workers each
carrying out the original broad task. According to Smith, the division of labor is limited,
however, by the extent of the market.3 But Smith’s theory cannot satisfactorily explain
the recent surge in production specialization if in fact most firms are small relative to their
global markets.4 The reason for this is that Smith failed to realize that division of labor
is also intrinsically limited by the technology in production coordination (or coordination
cost, in modern language).
I incorporate this idea into the continuum-good Ricardian model of Dornbusch, et al.
(1977) and build a Smith-Ricardo model of international trade, where the division of labor
is endogenously determined by the trade-oﬀ between the eﬃciency gain and coordination
cost associated with production specialization. A progress in IT that reduces the coordi-
nation cost in production increases the eﬃcient level of division of labor, which in turn
aﬀects a country’s comparative advantage and trade pattern. The result suggests that the
recent revolution in IT could be a very important driving force behind the current changes
in the patterns of international trade and production (e.g., fragmentation/outsourcing, ver-
tical/horizontal specialization, etc.)
The paper also shows that even if both countries have access to the same information
technology, an IT progress tends to reduce the competitive margin of a less-developed
country (LDC), and help a developed country (DC) recover its competitive margin lost to
the LDC because of its low wage and large labor supply. The result may shed light on the
U.S. economy (and some other DCs) that has maintained its competitiveness vis-a-vis other
low-wage LDCs during the last two decades. In addition, unlike its predecessor (i.e. the
Ricardian model of Dornbusch et al. 1977), this Smith-Ricardo model retains Smith’s spirit
in that the absolute advantage (in division of labor) plays a crucial role in determining the
3Also see “The division of labor is limited by the extent of the market” by Stigler (1951).
4 If firms are small relative to their market, the division of labor is already approaches the limit and a
further increase in the market has little impact on the degree of division of labor.
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eﬀects of an IT progress on a country’s competitive margin in international trade.
Students in international economics know Smith because of his theory on absolute ad-
vantage and international trade (though we then tell them that absolute advantage plays
a much less important role in international trade compared to comparative advantage).
Much less attention is paid to the role of Smith’s division of labor in international trade,
however. In the modern economic theory, that role has been taken over by overall technol-
ogy progress. The seminal work by Ethier (1982) is the first paper in international trade
literature to formally model the eﬃciency gain resulting from division of labor in produc-
tion.5 Instead of directly modelling the simple process in Smith’s idea on division of labor,
Ethier focuses on the external economies of scale (resulting from specialized inputs) in the
production of final goods. In contrast, in this paper I emphasize the simple role of Smith’
idea on division of labor, and focus on the interplay of the eﬃciency gain of division of labor
and the costs of production coordination. Furthermore, in this modified Ricardian model,
absolute advantage (in division of labor) now plays a crucial role in determining the eﬀects
of an IT progress on a country’s competitive margin in international trade.
There is relatively small but growing research interests on Smith’s theory of division of
labor and specialization.6 Most studies in this literature, however, use the inframarginal
analysis and focus on specialization (or division of labor) at individuals ’ level. Cheng et
al. (2000) provides an application of this approach in a 2-good Ricardian model. Instead
of modelling specialization at individuals’ level, following Ethier and many others, I focus
on specialization and division of labor in production process.
My approach is more closely related to Taylor (1994a, 1994b) that extend the continuum-
good Ricardian model to incorporate the ‘quality ladders’ approach of Grossman and Help-
man (1991). Assuming industries/sectors have diﬀerent production and research technolo-
gies, Taylor focuses on the innovation that reduces unit production costs. In my model
sectors diﬀer in industrial technology but access the same communication/information tech-
5See other influential work by Grossman and Helpman (1989, 1990), and Romer (1986, 1990).
6E.g., see Young (1991), an excellent survey of this literature by Yang and Ng (1998), and the pioneering
work by Yang himself and his coauthors.
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nology. Equilibrium division of labor lowers unit production costs. In Taylor (1994a, 1994b),
however, absolute advantage does not play a significant role, but in this model it does.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 first characterizes the eﬃcient
division of labor and then develops the general equilibrium model. Section 3 provides some
comparative statics focusing on the eﬀects an IT progress and relative labor supply. Section
4 provides some concluding remarks and thoughts on possible directions of future research.
2. THE MODEL
In this section I build up the model based on the continuum-good Ricardian model of
Dornbusch, et al. (1977), where the goods are indexed by z over the support [0,1]. There are
two countries, home and foreign, and I often use variables of the home country to describe
the economy. The foreign variables are denoted with an asterisk.
2.1. Production technology
In the absence of division of labor, the unit labor requirement of producing good z in the
home country is a(z, 1), z ∈ [0, 1]. Production of good z, however, can also be divided into
n subtasks to produce n components first and then they are assembled into the final good.
Instead of having to perform the broad task of producing a good, workers now only need
to do a particular single subtask. Such production specialization will increase production
eﬃciency due to the division of labor (in the spirit of Adam Smith’s pin-factory story).
2.1.1. Smithean Division of labor.–
For the sake of simplicity, suppose that all components are divided in such a way that
the unit labor requirement of producing each component is the same,
d(z, n) =
a(z, 1)
n
K(z)n−1, 0 < K(z) < 1, z ∈ [0, 1] (1)
where K(z) is a technological parameter for division of labor, indicating the level of in-
dustrial technology. The lower the value of K(z), the better the technology. Notice that
1 − K(z)n−1 measures the eﬃciency gain due to the division of labor in production. For
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example, when n = 1, d(z, 1) = a(z, 1) since there is no production specialization; when
n = 2, d(z, 2) is equal to K(z) fraction of a(z, 1)/2 because of the eﬃciency gain from the
division of labor.
2.1.2. Production coordination and eﬃcient production specialization.–
There is coordination cost associated with subdividing production process and assembly
of components. The larger the number of subdivided tasks, the higher the total coordination
costs. The costs of production coordination are often aﬀected by more general technology
(e.g., communication/information technology, or other general-purpose technology), rather
than the specific industrial technology.
Suppose that y(z)i, i = 1, ..., n, is the amount of ithcomponent used in producing good
z, and that x(z, n) is the output of good z. Assume that the subdivided components
are exclusive to each other in the sense that substitution is not allowed among them.7
Production of final goods from components is assumed to follow the following augmented
Leontief production function,
x(z, n) = [1− (n− 1)Γ(z)]min{y(z)1, y(z)2, ..., y(z)n}, 0 < Γ(z) < 1, z ∈ [0, 1] (2)
where Γ(z) is a technological parameter for production coordination. Notice that (n−1)Γ(z)
measures the coordination cost, in units of x(z, n), associated with the specialization of
production of good z.
Eﬃcient assembly requires that y(z) ≡ y(z)1 = ...y(z)n and therefore, (2) becomes
x(z, n) = [1− (n− 1)Γ(z)]y(z), z ∈ [0, 1] (3)
For example, when n = 1, we have x(z, 1) = y(z) since no assembly of components is
required; when n = 2, one unit of each component together can only produce 1− Γ(z) unit
of final good z.
In this paper I assume that division of labor takes place within a firm.8 From (3), to
produce one unit of good z requires 1/[1− (n−1)Γ(z)] units of each component. Therefore,
7This is more relevant to vertical specialization in production. In this paper we do not focus on the
diﬀerence between vertical and horizontal specialization.
8See further discussion about this assumption in Section 4.
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the unit labor requirement for producing good z is [using (1)],
a(z, n) =
nd(z, n)
1− (n− 1)Γ(z)
= a(z, 1)
K(z)n−1
1− (n− 1)Γ(z) , z ∈ [0, 1] (4)
Given that we have both the eﬃciency gain and the coordination cost associated with
production specialization, the eﬃcient level of specialization (or the division of labor) is
endogenously determined by the following optimization problem:
ne(z) ≡ argmin
n
a(z, n) = a(z, 1)
K(z)n−1
1− (n− 1)Γ(z)
= 1 +
1
Γ(z) +
1
lnK(z)
, z ∈ [0, 1] (5)
Given the existing technology, K(z) and Γ(z), firms have to choose n = ne(z) to produce
good z in order to stay competitive. Notice that if coordination and assembly have no costs
(i.e., Γ(z) is close to zero), firms will choose a very high level of production specialization
(i.e. ne(z) will approach infinitive) to take advantage of the eﬃciency gain from the division
of labor. This is a very important point that was missed by Adam Smith. Smith only
recognized that division of labor is limited by the extent of the market. He failed to
realize that division of labor is also intrinsically limited by the technology in production
coordination. The latter is important and probably more relevant today.
From (5) it is straightforward to show that (noticing that lnK(z) < 0),
dne
dΓ(z) < 0 and
dne
dK (z)
< 0. (6)
Therefore, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 1 A reduction of the coordination cost and/or a rise in the eﬃciency gain
of division of labor increases the eﬃcient level of production specialization (or division of
labor).
Proposition 1 is simple but fundamental. It suggests that a key economic force be-
hind the current phenomenon in international trade and production (e.g., fragmentation,
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outsourcing, vertical/horizontal specialization, etc.) could be the recent revolution in com-
munication/information technology.
From (5) notice that with a diﬀerent Γ0(z), we can always find a corresponding K 0(z)
that gives us the same ne(z). Thus we can let the parameter of the industrial technol-
ogy, K (z) , to capture the diﬀerence in the technology that is sector-specific, and let the
technological parameter for production coordination, Γ(z), to capture the role of commu-
nication/information technology that in general aﬀects all sectors. Specifically, for the rest
of the analysis I assume Γ(z) = γ for all z and the corresponding K 0(z) = k(z). Therefore,
(4) becomes,
a(z, ne) = a(z, 1)
(k(z))ne−1
1− (ne − 1)γ
= a(z, 1)φ(z, ne), z ∈ [0, 1] (7)
where φ(z, ne) ≡ (k(z))
ne−1
1−(ne−1)γ .
Applying the envelope theorem to (7), we obtain the following results.
Proposition 2
da(z, ne)
dγ
γ
a(z, ne)
=
(ne(z)− 1)γ
1− (ne(z)− 1)γ
> 0 and is increasing in ne(z).
A progress in information technology that reduces the coordination cost increases pro-
duction eﬃciency. The eﬃciency gain, however, is diﬀerent across sectors, depending on the
level of production specialization. The higher the level of production specialization that a
sector has, the greater the gain of its production eﬃciency. The second point is important
for the results of our subsequent analysis.
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2.2. Market structure, goods prices, and comparative advantage
Assume that perfect competition prevails. If good z is produced in the home country,
then its price becomes
p(z, ne) = wa(z, ne)
= wa(z, 1)φ(z, ne) (8)
= wa(z, 1)
(k(z))ne−1
1− (ne − 1)γ
, z ∈ [0, 1]
where w is the wage rate in the home country. To focus on the eﬀects due to the common
shock (progress/innovation) in information technology, I assume γ∗ = γ. Thus, if good z is
produced in the foreign country, its price becomes,
p∗(z, n∗e) = w
∗a∗(z, n∗e)
= wa∗(z, 1)φ(z, n∗e) (9)
= w∗a∗(z, 1)
(k∗(z))n
∗
e−1
1− (n∗e − 1)γ
, z ∈ [0, 1]
With perfect competition and zero transport cost, good z will be produced at the home
country if and only if
wa(z, ne) ≤ w∗a∗(z, n∗e), or ω ≡
w
w∗
≤ a
∗(z, n∗e)
a(z, ne)
≡ A(z, ne, n∗e) (10)
where ω ≡ w/w∗ is the relative wage and A(z, ne, n∗e) ≡ a∗(z, n∗e)/a(z, ne) is the relative
unit labor requirement. Furthermore,
A(z, ne, n
∗
e) ≡ a∗(z, n∗e)/a(z, ne)
=
a∗(z, 1)
a(z, 1)
φ∗(z, n∗e)
φ(z, ne)
(11)
= A(z, 1, 1)Φ(z, ne, n∗e)
whereA(z, 1, 1) ≡ a∗(z, 1)/a(z, 1) and Φ(z, ne, n∗e) ≡ φ∗(z, n∗e)/φ(z, ne). Notice thatA(z, 1, 1)
is the relative unit labor requirement in the absence of division of labor (as in Dornbusch,
et al. 1977).
9
Similar to Young (1991), I rank goods hierarchically by their level of technical sophisti-
cation. For being analytically tractable, I use the following assumptions.
Assumption 1: a(z, 1) and a∗(z, 1) are increasing but k(z) and k∗(z) are decreasing in z.
Assumption 2: a∗(z, 1)/a(z, 1) and k∗(z)/k(z) are decreasing in z.
Assumption 3: k∗(z) and k(z) are crossing, and k∗(zk)/k(zk) = 1, zk ∈ (0, 1).
These three assumptions are fairly intuitive. First, a more sophisticated good has a higher
unit labor requirement when there is no division of labor. But its eﬃciency gain from the
division of labor is also higher (it isn’t much the eﬃciency gain from dividing a simple
production process into several subtasks). Using (5), we can also show that the eﬃcient
level of division of labor, ne, is increasing in z. Secondly, the home country’s initial (i.e.
without the division of labor) comparative advantage is diminishing in z, which could be
attributed to the diﬀerence in human capital between the two countries. Furthermore, the
pattern of the initial comparative advantage and the industrial technology (in the division
of labor) is positively correlated, although not perfectly so.9 Thirdly, the home country has
an absolute advantage in the division of labor in the less sophisticated goods (z ∈ [0, zk)),
and the foreign country in the more sophisticated goods (z ∈ (zk, 0]). This diﬀerence could
simply result from learning-by-doing in production. It will be clear that our analysis will
include the special (and relatively simple) case in which one country has an advantage in
the division of labor for all goods. The k∗(z) and k(z) curves are illustrated 1n Figure 1.
From Assumption 2, the A(z, 1, 1)-curve is decreasing in z as depicted in Figure 2. To
draw the A(z, ne, n∗e)-curve, we have to find out how the presence of Φ(z, ne, n∗e) in (11)
deforms the A(z, 1, 1)-curve. Using the envelope theorem, (7) and (5), we obtain that
z
Φ(z, ne, n∗e)
dΦ(z, ne, n∗e)
dz
=
dφ∗(z, n∗e)
dz
z
φ∗(z, n∗e)
− dφ(z, ne)
dz
z
φ(z, ne)
= (n∗e − 1)
k∗0(z)
k∗(z)
− (ne − 1)
k0(z)
k(z)
(12)
= (1/γ + 1/ ln k∗(z))
k∗0(z)
k∗(z)
− (1/γ + 1/ ln k(z))k
0(z)
k(z)
9This is similar to the assmption in Taylor (1994a, 1994b) that a country’s pattern of comparative
advantage in goods and R&D production is positively correlated.
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Notice that when z = zk (i.e. k∗(z) = k(z)), we have Φ(z, ne, n∗e) = 1 and dΦ(z, ne, n∗e)/dz <
0 since k∗0(z)/k∗(z) < k0(z)/k(z) from Assumption 2. Also, it is not diﬃcult to show
that the solution of Φ(z, ne, n∗e) = 1 is unique. Thus, Φ(z, ne, n∗e) > 1 when z < zk and
Φ(z, ne, n∗e) < 1 when z > zk. Therefore, A(z, ne, n∗e) is above A(z, 1, 1) when z < zk, and
A(z, ne, n
∗
e) is below A(z, 1, 1) when z > zk, as illustrated in Figure 2.
From (10), for a given relative wage ω, the home (resp. foreign) will produce the goods
in the range of 0 ≤ z ≤ ez(ω) (resp. ez(ω) ≤ z ≤ 1). The competitive margin is determined
by
ez = A−1(ω) (13)
where A−1(ω) is the inverse function of A(z, ne, n∗e).
2.3. Demand, Trading equilibrium, and competitive margin
The two countries are populated with L and L∗ consumers, respectively, and each supplies
one unit of labor. All consumers have the same Cobb-Douglas utility function,
u =
Z 1
0
b(z) lnx(z)dz (14)
where x(z) is the consumption of good z, and b(z) is the share of expenditure on good z,
with
R 1
0 b(z)dz = 1. From (13), suppose the home country produces the goods in the range
[0, ez). Then, the fraction of income spent on the goods produced by the home country is
ϑ(ez) ≡ R ez0 b(z)dz, in both countries, and that by the foreign country is R 1ez b(z)dz = 1−ϑ(ez).
Balance-of-trade requires,
(1− ϑ(ez))wL = ϑ(ez)w∗L∗ (15)
Rearranging (15) yields
ω =
ϑ(ez)
1− ϑ(ez)(L/L∗) ≡ B(ez, L∗/L) (16)
where B(z, L∗/L) is increasing in z.
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Figure 3 combines both the demand and the supply side, and the equilibrium is deter-
mined by the intersection of B(z, L∗/L)-curve and A(z, ne, n∗e)-curve:
ω = A(z, ne, n
∗
e) = B(z, L
∗/L) (17)
where ω is the relative wage and z is the competitive margin in equilibrium.
3. IT PROGRESS, COMPETITIVE MARGIN, AND LABOR SUPPLY
To determine how a progress in information technology aﬀects the equilibrium outcome,
we have to find out about the eﬀect of a change in γ on A(z, ne, n∗e)-curve. Using (5) and
Proposition 2, we obtain
γ
A(z, ne, n∗e)
dA(z, ne, n
∗
e)
dγ
=
da∗(z, n∗e)
dγ
γ
a∗(z, n∗e)
− da(z, ne)
dγ
γ
a(z, ne)
=
(n∗e(z)− 1)γ
1− (n∗e(z)− 1)γ
− (ne(z)− 1)γ
1− (ne(z)− 1)γ
(18)
= −(1 + ln k
∗(z)
γ
) + (1 +
ln k(z)
γ
)
= (1/γ) ln[k(z)/k∗(z)]
Thus, together with Assumptions 2 and 3 we have the following result.
Proposition 3
(i)
dA(z, ne, n
∗
e)
dγ
|z=zk = 0; (ii)
γ
A(z, ne, n∗e)
dA(z, ne, n
∗
e)
dγ
is increasing in z for all z ∈ [0, 1].
At z = zk, a reduction in γ has no eﬀect on the relative unit labor requirement. A
reduction in γ, however, will improve a country’s comparative advantage for the goods for
which it has absolute advantage in the division of labor.10 That is, γA(z,ne,n∗e)
dA(z,ne,n∗e)
dγ < 0
for z < zk, and
γ
A(z,ne,n∗e)
dA(z,ne,n∗e)
dγ > 0 for z > zk. Furthermore, the greater the absolute
advantage in the division of labor, the larger the improvement of its comparative advantage.
10Suppose that A(z, 1, 1) is horizontal by ignoring the initial diﬀerence, then an absolute advantage in the
division of labor represents an absolute advantage in production of goods.
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The intuition for the second point can be found in Proposition 2. A progress in IT reduces
the labor requirement of each subtask (including the initial decomposing and the final
assembly), and such cost saving multiplies as the number of subtasks increases. On the
other hand, a greater absolute advantage in the division of labor results in a larger number
of subtasks in producing the good.
Diagrammatically, the A(z, ne, n∗e)-curve tilts clockwise at point A(zk, ne, n
∗
e) when there
is a reduction in γ. Since in general zk does not coincide with z, the eﬀect on the competitive
margin (i.e. z) depends on whether zk is larger or smaller than z.When z < zk, a reduction
in γ moves z to the right, increasing the range of goods produced by the home country
(Figure 4). When z > zk, it moves z to the left, increasing the range of goods produced
by the foreign country (Figure 5). Therefore, we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 4 When z < zk (resp. z > zk), an IT progress increases the home (resp.
foreign) country’s competitive margin, i.e. dz/dγ < 0 (resp. dz/dγ > 0).
So what determines whether z < zk or z > zk? One important variable is the relative
labor supply, L∗/L. From (16), an increase in L shifts the B(z, L∗/L)-curve downward,
moving z to the right. The intuition is as follows. For instance, when the labor supply
in the home country is large relative to the foreign country, its wage becomes relative low,
cetaris paribus. The lower wage will help the home country increase its competitive margin
beyond zk. For the goods in the range (zk, z), however, the foreign country has an absolute
advantage in the division of labor. Therefore, a progress in IT will help the foreign country
to recover some of its competitive margin lost due to the lower wage (or larger labor supply)
in the home country. In summary,
Proposition 5 An IT progress tends to reduce (resp. increase) the competitive margin of
the economy of a larger (resp. smaller) labor supply.
These results may shed light on the U.S. economy (and some other DCs) that has main-
tained its competitiveness vis-a-vis other low-wage LDCs during the last two decades. In
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addition to the fact that DCs usually have better IT, our results show that even if all coun-
tries could access the same IT, the recent IT revolution may benefit DCs in gaining back
some of its competitive margin lost in trade with low-wage economies.
Finally, from (18), notice that γA(z,ne,n∗e)
dA(z,ne,n∗e)
dγ is decreasing in γ. Therefore, the eﬀects
of the results in Propositions 3-5 are greater when γ becomes lower. In particular, following
Proposition 5 we conclude
Proposition 6 Continuing IT progresses will accelerate, rather than slow down, the speed
in losing (resp. gaining) its competitive margin of the economy of a larger (resp. smaller)
labor supply.
4. CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper presents a Smith-Ricardo model that incorporates division of labor into the
continuum-good Ricardian model to explain the impact of the recent IT revolution on a
country’ pattern of production specialization and international trade. Unlike its predecessor
(i.e. the Ricardian model of Dornbusch, et al. 1977), this Smith-Ricardo model retains
Smith’s spirit in that the absolute advantage (in division of labor) plays a crucial role in
determining the eﬀects of an IT progress on a country’s competitive margin in international
trade.
Given the relative simplicity of the model and the useful continuum-good Ricardian ap-
proach, this Smith-Ricardo structure could be relatively easily extended to examine other
issues. For instance, like Taylor (1994a, 1994b) one can introduce R&D in innovation to
make technology progress endogenous. Also, in the model we assume that division of labor
takes place within a firm. As long as components are not traded in the international mar-
ket, however, this specification is equivalent to the case in which firms can purchase their
intermediate components from competitive domestic suppliers. It would be interesting to
investigate an extension that allows international trade in the intermediate components.
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